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LISTENING FOR A CHANGE: THE
COURTS AND ORAL TRADITION
BY JOHN BORROWS*
Aboriginal oral history is a valuable source of
information about a people's past. It can constitute
important evidence as proofofpriorevents, and.'orit can
shed light on meanings groups giveto theirpast. Despite
its value, however, oral tradition presents particular
challenges ofadmissibility and interpretation because of
its unique source and transmission. This article outlines
and discuses these challenges and suggests various
approaches to better understand the insights contained
vithin aboriginal history.
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I. INTRODUCTION
My Aunt Irene lived in a blue clapboard bungalow on the top of an
escarpment that overlooked the reservation. From her front window you
could see down Sydney Bay Bluff Road, across the "prairie," to the
peninsula that gave Cape Croker its name. Framing "the Cape" were the
vast cerulean waters of Georgian Bay. From this perch you could watch the
people of Neyaashingaming come and go. Aunt Irene was familiar with all
that she could take in. She could tell you the family history of each resident
who passed by her window, and she knew the stories that made sacred the
place where each one lived. When I was a young boy we would sometimes
visit her and she would relate a thing or two about this world. I would
always enjoy the soda she served me but was frankly a little scared by her
and did not know what to do while her stories went on and on. She was kind
and loving, but for a boy who spent more time off the reserve than on, I did
not know what to make of the strange world she unfolded to me.
When I was older I began to appreciate a little more the knowledge
Aunt Irene carried. I can remember visiting her house with Grandpa Josh
(her brother), my mother, and my sister and listening to her reminiscences.
I would see her on and off through the years, but she was never really a big
part of my life. Then one day when I was in graduate school, I went to ask
her about the history of the reserve. I was with my mother and Aunt
Norma. We spent a couple of hours there and, in her unforgettable way, she
told us the history of our family as it related to Cape Croker. She knew
details about my great-great-great-grandfather and grandmother, and
everyone down through their line until my generation. I was amazed. She
was a living history book. I finally caught a glimpse of the world that had
made me feel so uneasy as a boy. I realized that the discomfort I once felt
was due more to my disorienting unfamiliarity with the people she talked
about than to any unusual behaviour on her part. In fact, from her stories
I came to take great comfort in the knowledge that I fit into this world she
described and was related to it in more ways than I even knew.
Aunt Irene's narrative became the backbone of the Master's thesis
I was working on at the time, a genealogical legal history of the Cape
Croker Indian Reserve.' The framework she provided helped me make
sense of the fragmentary archival material that I had been sorting through
J. Borrows, "A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and First Nations Self-Government"
(1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L. J. 291 [hereinafter Genealogy of Law]. Cape Croker is also known as the
Chippewas of the Nawash Reservation. The people are Anishinabek, sometimes also called Ojibway.
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prior to that visit. It was as if she had presented the picture of the puzzle I
was building, an account I still held in scattered pieces. Her wonderful
narrative helped me to shape the papered remnants of our history into
something approaching a recognizable representation. I later triangulated
her stories with those of my great-uncle Fred, John Nadgiwon, "Chick"
(Walter Johnson), Aunt Norma, and my mother, and with the archival
materials I had been working with, to fill in the details of the work.
The experience I had with Aunt Irene gave me a great respect for
oral history. I realized that it could be enormously helpful in assembling a
portrait of the past. It can provide evidence of prior circumstances that may
not be available in written documents or other formally recorded
instruments. For example, Aunt Irene told me information about my great-
great-grandfather's treaty-making activities that were not available in the
written record. Peter Kegedonce Jones, my great-great-grandfather, had
signed two treaties in 18542 and 18573 that promised many material goods
and services in return for non-native people settling on our territory. In
fact, Peter's signature was the first one on the 1857 treaty. These treaties
covered over five hundred thousand acres of prime land in southwestern
Ontario, extending east from Goderich on Lake Huron to Arthur in central
southwestern Ontario, and then north to Owen Sound on Lake Huron. I
found that the archives contained valuable information about Peter's
decision to enter into these agreements. Written sources told of promises
secured for sharing the land: they included increasing capital payments
through trust fund deposits and payments,4 the provision of education, the
building of infrastructure (such as roads, public buildings, and docks), large
2 For the text of Treaty 72, see Canada, Indian Trcaties and Surrenders (Toronto; Coles Publhshm
Company, 1971) at 195-96.
3 For text, see ibi at 213.
4 NA (Canada), RG 10, vol. 541,101 at 105, letter from T.G. Andersan, Supirintcndent of Indian
Affairs, to the Chiefs of the Central superintendency" (2 August 1854):
We want a ,itten paper from the Go% eminent saying that the pnncipal camingin for the Rcsetce
will be funded for ourselves and the future generation and that %%e and they shall receite the
interest of it every year.
2001]
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reserves, 5 housing,6 and for the provision of hunting, fishing, and timber
rights. 7 In fact, the people of Cape Crocker were told "that from the sale of
the land [they] would soon have a large income, would all be able to ride in
carriages, roll in wealth and fare sumptuously every day." 8 Yet, despite this
detail, I discovered that the written record was incomplete. It was only
through Aunt Irene's oral accounts that a fuller picture emerged as to why
such agreements were made. She told me that, despite its monetary
implications, Peter and his people signed the treaty first and foremost as an
exercise of self-respect and self-determination. Many people in the band
wanted to remove themselves from the destructive influences of alcohol,
which was becoming a problem in their community in Owen Sound.' This
5bMid at 104:
We see the quantity of land reserved for ourselves as marked in the map is not large enough
therefore we beg our Great Father to increase the quantity to the pencil lines which we have
drawn on the map embracing the Fishing Islands and Cape Croker with the tract from the Owen
Sounds to the Head of Colpoy's Bay. These are the three reserves marked in pencil we want to
keep for ourselves and Children on the main land, The Island we say nothing about as they belong
to us and we wish to keep them.
6 NA (Canada), RG 10, vol. 117, 169150 at 169151-55, Report on Negotiation Proceedings
Regarding surrender of the Saugeen Tract (Treaty No. 72) (3 November 1854). Governor General
Oliphant outlined the promises in the treaty:
I explained the advantage which would accrue to them from so large an augmentation of finances
as must result from the sale of their lands, by which they would be enabled to erect schools extend
their farms and purchase many comforts of which they were now deprived ... I finally promised
that those Chiefs who were prepared to meet the government in this measure so productive of
benefit to their bands would be rewarded by Your Excellency with medals.
7 A band petition to Queen Victoria in 1860 indicates what they were promised during treaty. NA
(Canada), RG 10, vol. 266, 163303 at 163303-09, petition of Cape Croker to Queen Victoria (17 April
1860):
However, we made up our minds to surrender on the following conditions 1st - that we would
have the privilege of purchasing land - 2nd that our yearly annuities would continue to increase
every year. 3rd - that comfortable houses would be built every year until every family would be
supplied with one, 4th - and that a church also be erected. ... If we could only have this privilege
of all that we should call our own - have the sole management of our lands, our fisheries, our
hunting, our timbers, our monies, we would be satisfied ...
8 Enemikeese (C. Van Dusen), The Indian Chief.An Account of the Labours, Losses, Sufferings and
Oppressions of Ke-zig-ko-e-ne-ne (David Sawyer), A Chief of the Indians in Canada West (Toronto: Coles,
1974) at 51.
9 Ten years after my visit with Aunt Irene I found a document that contained the same information
she had orally related to me. The letter was written after 1985 (no specific date given) in her own
handwriting and addressed to Peter Schmalz, a teacher who had done research among the Anishinabek
of southern Ontario. Her account reads:
My People came here from what is now Brooke close to Owen Sound. The reason for moving from
that well-established village was the coming of the pioneer farmers and the fur traders. Many of
these pioneers were squatters on Indian land. They also brought with them the 'Demon Drink' as
[VOL. 39, NO. I
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insight deepened my understanding of why my ancestors would agree, as
part of their treaty negotiations, to their removal from their productive
farms and hunting grounds. It helped me to appreciate the great value of
oral tradition in compiling a more complete representation of the past.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF ORAL HISTORY
While I saw the value of oral tradition, I also recognized that it
could present some unique challenges to makingsense of what went before.
Oral history presents both risk and insight because it simultaneously
intermingles the events that took place in the past and the meaning that
people ascribe to those events."0 As the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples noted, "oral history is enmeshed with the stories of a lifetime.""
The blending of incident and interpretation presents special problems of
verification for oral history, problems which are sometimes different from
those contained in a documentary reconstruction of the past. t2 For example,
many of my Aunt Irene's stories about my great-great-grandfather
contained references to supernatural events. These references potentially
would undermine the credibility of oral history if they were included in
certain academic histories or repeated in court. I was aware that a portion
of my scholarly or legal audience would have reacted negatively to the
appearance of "little people," "bear-walkers," or "underwater lions" in my
history. I imagined that some would call into question the more
conventional aspects of the narrative because they were intermingled with
mygrandfather called into.ants. The idea of these vhite peoplewastoget the Indianstobccome
drunkardswho would do anything for a bottle of 'fireweater,* from giving aw'ay his furs to giving up
his children or his land. Chief Peter Kegedonce Jones believed that strong drink %--ould ruin his
Indian People and w.as concerned in his own mind that their onlysahation w,,as to mo. e aay from
such temptation to a place that was very hard to reach. The only %,ay to get to Cape Croker yas
by boat or over meandering trails through the bush.
10 A. Portelli, The Death of Luigi Trastulli: Form and Mcaning in Oral Hist ry (Albany State
University of New York Press. 1991) at 50 [hereinafter Dcath of Luigil.
11 Canada, Report of the Royal Conmssion on Aboriginal PcoplesJ Uong Forward, Leak.w Bach,
vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Setvices Canada, 1996) at 33 (hereinafter Loking Fenvardl. I have used the
terms "oral history" and "oral tradition" interchangeably in this article. Some have argued that each
term should be treated separately, with oral history representing the product of communication, and
oral tradition signifying the process of communication. I have not separated the tt,.o becau"', as this
article vll reveal, I believe that the product and process of communication are inseparablyintertwined.
12 Although, the problems of verification for written and oral sources are not al-ays as different
as some might assume, see P. Thompson, The Moice of the Past: Oral Hastciy. 3d ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000) at 118-125.
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these more unorthodox elements.
From my study of Anishinabek (Ojibway) documentary history, I
was familiar with the literature that cast doubt on the reliability of oral
traditions in drawing inferences and conclusions about the past. Nicolas
Perrot, a primary and leading source for Anishinabek history, wrote about
Aboriginal oral traditions in the most disparaging of terms. For example,
he observed that: "Among them there is no knowledge of letters or of the
art of writing; and all their history of ancient times proves to be only
confused and fabulous notions, which are so simple, so gross, and so
ridiculous that they only deserve to be brought to light in order to show the
ignorance and rudeness of these peoples."'3 I knew that such opinions
would be hard to shake. Many early writers of Anishinabek history shared
Perrot's critical views about oral tradition, although such judgement was
not uniform.1 4 Despite some dissent, an unreflective treatment of oral
tradition still infused the prevailing culture of inquiry. I knew that "the
weight of history" was against me in questioning these views.'5
I also knew that these prejudices could find expression in the more
recent literature too. Robert Lowie, an influential American
anthropologist, wrote that he could "not attach to oral traditions any
historical value whatsoever under any conditions whatsoever." 6 Lowie had
13 E. Blair, ed., The Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes as
Described by Nicolas Perrot, French Commandant in the Northwest; Bacqueville de la Potherie, French
Royal Commissioner to Canada; Morrell Marston, American Army Officer; and Thomas Forsyth, United
StatesAgent at FortArmstrong, vol. 1, trans. E. Blair (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996) at 31.
14 See B.G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada'sHeroicAgeReconsidered (Montreal: McGill-
Queen's University Press, 1985) at 3-49. Perhaps, not surprisingly, the writings of early Anishinabek
authors treated oral history in a more favourable light, see W.W. Warren & E.D. Neill, History of the
Ojibway Nation (Minneapolis: Ross & Haines, 1970); G. Copway or Kah-ge-ga-gah-bowh, The
Traditional History and Characteristic Sketches of the Ojibway Nation (Toronto: Coles, 1972); P. Jones,
Life and Journals of Kah-ke-wa-quo-na-by (Rev. Peter Jones), Wesleyan Missionary (Toronto: Anson
Green, 1860).
For discussions on the use of "weight of history" arguments against Aboriginal peoples, see J.
Singer, "Well Settled? The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims" (1994) 28
Ga. L. Rev. 481.
16 R.H. Lowie, "Oral Tradition and History" (1915) 17 Am. Anthropologist 597 at 598, One of
Lowie's main objections to oral tradition was that the actions and events remembered within societies
with these traditions did not often deal with significant items. For example, he was critical of the
Assiniboine lndians' failure to remember the introduction of the horse among them after the arrival
of Europeans. In response to his criticism it may be observed that all history is selective in what it
records as being significant. As Atkinson has stated, "Selection is inevitable, and with the recognition
of this comes the possibility of new doubts about its objectivity." R.F. Atkinson, Knowledge and
Explanation in History: An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: MeMillan Press, 1978) at
69. It is possible that at first the Assiniboine did not view the coming of the Europeans and the horse
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such a low view of oral tradition that he concluded that, if the "primitive
notions tally with ours, so much the better for them, not for ours." 7 In the
same vein, the noted English historian Hugh Trevor-Roper also observed
that it was inappropriate to write history based on oral traditions. He
counseled his fellow historians that "we should not amuse ourselves with
the unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but irrelevant
comers of the globe; tribes whose chief function in history, in my opinion,
is to show to the present an image of the past from which, by history, it has
escaped."' 8 Such views led Trevor-Roper to conclude that only people with
written history should be studied and that "the rest is darkness...and
darkness is not the subject of history."'9 This assessment was not a
promising message for my study of Anishinabek legal history. I was mindful
of these and similar examples when I thought about the prejudices
Anishinabek history might encounter if it was told with all its supernatural
elements.
Yet I had to ask myself: What explains the pervasive bias against
oral tradition? From my own experience I knew it had great value. It
seemed to me that some people regarded the passage of oral traditions as
the game of "telephone" many of us played as children. You may
remember how this game was played. After recess, when the teacher
wanted to quiet us down from our boisterous outdoor activities, we would
be asked to sit quietly in a circle to try an experiment. The teacher would
then help our six- or seven-year-old bodies settle into a somewhat orderly
formation, and whisper a message in a child's ear. The child who received
the message would have to pass it along to the next person, and so on,
through twenty or so children, until the message within the circle reached
its beginning point. You might also remember the outcome of this game:
Messages like "See me run and stand" might turn out to be "Steamy buns
and jam."
Despite the truths this game might reveal about our short-term
listening skills as young children, it is questionable whether this common
analogy was appropriate for considering the accuracy of tribal societies' oral
traditions. There are three potential problems. First, for many communities
the transmission of oral tradition is not conveyed in such a singular,
as very significant and thus did not select this event as orth recording in their traditions.
1 7 R. H. Lowie, "Oral Tradition and History"' (1917) 30 J. of Am. Folklore 161 at 163.
18 H. Trevor-Roper, The Rise of Claristian Europe (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 165)
at 9.
1 9
Ibid.
20011
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detached, and decontextualized way. As such, the game of telephone
oversimplifies the process of transmission in Aboriginal tradition. Oral
history in numerous Aboriginal groups is conveyed through interwoven
layers of culture that entwine to sustain national memories over the lifetime
of many generations. The transmission of oral tradition in these societies
is bound up with the configuration of language, political structures,
economic systems, social relations, intellectual methodologies, morality,
ideology, and the physical world. These factors assist people in knitting
historic memories more tightly in their minds. There are many types of
traditions that are a product of this process: memorized speech, historical
gossip, personal reminiscences, formalized group accounts, representations
of origins and genesis, genealogies, epics, tales, proverbs, and sayings.20 In
their aggregation, each of these cultural strands wound together and were
reinforced by specific practices. These practices include such complex
customs as pre-hearing preparations, mnemonic devices, ceremonial
repetition, the appointment of witnesses, dances, feasts, songs, poems, the
use of testing, and the use and importance of place and geographic space
to help ensure that certain traditions are accredited within the community.
Oral tradition does not stand alone but is given meaning through the
context of the larger cultural experiences that surround it.
The second problem in analogizing the game of telephone to
Aboriginal oral history is that it often assumes that intentional change in
the transmission of messages is unrecognizable and unstoppable. This
concern also has an answer. Recall the game of telephone once again: "See
me run and stand" could turn out to be "There are seven bears in the tent."
Such deliberate changes might be made during the game to liven up the
activity, to see how entertaining it would sound to have the message
changed completely when it reached the end of the circle. Children might
do this in an attempt to draw attention to themselves as being funny,
creative, or playfully mischievous when it is later discovered who made the
changes. In doing this, they may hope that others will respond to them in
more flattering ways. They change the message so that they can become
more popular and have greater opportunities with their friends. The same
might be said to happen in the transmission of oral tradition. People who
tell stories might make changes to oral messages, perhaps not so much to
receive the benefit of greater entertainment, but to obtain more material
benefits that they hope will accrue to them because of the changes. In the
20 This list is taken from J. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1985) at 13-27.
[VOL. 39, NO. I
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case of traditions that are brought forward by Aboriginal peoples to
establish their rights, there is no denying the point that there are many
incentives to recount them in a way that favours the establishment of their
case. Aboriginal people are subject to the same flaws and frailties as other
people in similar circumstances.
In response to this concern, it should be noted that there are usually
certain people in any given group who preserve accounts of tradition in a
way that sustains a more multilayered view of the community's past. While
some might try to mislead, others in the group will have the same
propensity for honesty and integrity that is found in all populations. They
will be sensitive to the numerous interpretations and meanings of past
events and will recount oral histories in a way that reflects this fact. Some
are even formally commissioned to bear this responsibility and will be true
to the charge to relate the complexities of these histories as they know
them. Such people, formally and informally chosen, will help to ensure that
the competing motivations found within their history are appropriately
reproduced. Their presence will help to ensure that many different
accounts of the same event are preserved in a recognizable form. Their
efforts protect the understanding of past events from outright intentional
change.
The third potential problem some see with oral tradition is, as
Professor Alexander von Gernet wrote, "ovenvhelming evidence that many
oral traditions do not remain consistent over time.""1 Professor von Gernet
cited three reasons for the lack of consistency in oral traditions. First, he
observed that memory is unreliable and is subject to permutation and
change. Second, the fact that oral tradition is based on recycled memories
enhances their potential for error and omissions over numerous repetitions.
Third, oral traditions are adversely influenced by the context in which they
are compiled. He suggested that since oral traditions are spoken under the
influence of present concerns and values, their reliability for providing a
true explanation of past events is contaminated Professor von Gernet's
21 A. von Gernet, Oral NarrativesatdAbori~i'zalPasts: An Interdisciplmtry, 1"e'oftheLitenatw'c
on Oral Traditions and Oral Histories (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs 1996) at 20, online: Indian
and Northern Affairs Canada <httptivvw.ainc-inaegc.caipripuborlindexe.html> (date aco ,-.d:
24 September 2001).
22 In a similarvein, ProfessorTom Flanagan has also questioned usesof oral history, quoting that
"the contradictions in what constitutes history - oral and witten - cannot be resolved." He states
that Aboriginal oral traditions can contradict Western conceptions of rationality. facts that can be
established by overwhelming documentary evidence, and that they can contradict one another.
However, in addressing Professor Flanagan on these points, it is apparent that wntten history can also
violate its own rationality, contradict facts established byoverw.helmingdocumentarycvidence, and pit
20011
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observations deserve attention. It is true that oral traditions can change
over time and that they can be influenced by present concerns and events.
Since I simultaneously agree and disagree with Professor von
Gernet's observations, I want to examine them. He gives a negative spin to
the variability of oral tradition that is not always warranted. He employs
words such as "unreliable," "error," and "contaminate," which are not
appropriate in certain circumstances. First, it is important to note that oral
traditions can remain quite consistent through generations of time and thus
be reliable for providing a good explanation of past events. In such cases,
von Gernet's observations may not take sufficient account of the checks and
balances in language, people, and culture that help to sustain such
memories. On the other hand, von Gernet is correct in observing that there
is a substantial body of literature that demonstrates the permeability and
fluidity of oral tradition through time. I want to suggest that this
observation does not lessen the value of oral tradition; rather, it provides
us with a different value by which it should be measured. As such, there are
many instances in which oral tradition does not warrant von Gernet's
negative labels. Sometimes there is something quite different going on in
the transmission of oral history than the mere recording of past events, and
this difference can lead to the accounts changing over time through the
adoption of more contemporary elements. This possibility does not mean
that oral history is of no value, it means that sometimes (though not always)
it has value for different purposes.
To return to our analogy: sometimes it is as if the game of
telephone is no longer about passing a message unchanged around the
circle but about giving meaning to the message which is consistent with its
original formulation. In these circumstances, the game draws its strength
from its participatory element, creating a message that is faithful to the
original while drawing on the skills and understanding of people in the
group to make the message meaningful. That is to say, with certain oral
histories, a different game may be being played than the verbatim
transmission of information. In some oral history simply passing the
message around the circle without trying to make it part of each person may
not be the object of the exercise. If we were children involved in such a
game, we would have to be careful that we did not judge the people playing
the game by the wrong rules. Similarly, lawyers, judges, and historians
observing and participating in the transmission of oral history should be
different accounts against each other. For a fuller examination of these points, see T. Flanagan, First
Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000) c. -L
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cautious in judging the differing and sometimes shifting purposes of oral
tradition. This counsel may be even more fitting when we recognize that
sometimes the game ve think we are playing can even shift back and forth
in mid-stream.
III. THE "FACTS" ABOUT ORAL HISTORY
The multifaceted elements of oral tradition can, however, make
working with it difficult. Those of us who may be attentive to its substance
and methodology are left with the task of trying to explain its usefulness for
historical and legal inquiry. As I have implied, while the recognition of oral
history's differences does not undermine factual validity, these differences
do suggest that special considerations will be relevant to determining such
validity and usefulness. Despite this challenge, the existence of explicitly
subjective elements in oral history can, at times, present greater
opportunities for understanding historical events than the recitation of bare
facts. It can reveal the intellectual, social, spiritual, and emotional cognition
of the event for the group in question. As a leading philosopher of oral
history has expressed: "[t]he importance of oral testimony may not lie in its
adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination,
symbolism, and desire emerge." So called "wong" statements can still be
psychologically true and reveal more about the people and events under
study than the mere fact being chronicled. A group's understanding of their
own past is as much a part of history as are more verifiable facts. "What
informants believe, is indeed a historical fact (that is, the fact that they
believe it), as much as what really happened. ' 4
For example, the Lemba of southern Africa have oral traditions that
are regarded by some as evidence of their historical migrations. If their
stories are true, then they contribute significantly to historical
understandings of dispersion and settlement patterns of people in their
region. However, even if the events described did not happen, their oral
traditions can also be important because they simultaneously provide a
great deal of insight into the Lemba's self-understanding of their own
identity and judgement of their history. For two thousand five hundred
years, the Bantu speaking Lemba of southern Africa say they have kept
alive an oral tradition about their Jewish ancestry and exodus from Judea
23 Death of Luigi, supra note 10 at 51.
2 41bid at 50.
2001)
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to Africa led by a man named Buba." They say that after travelling to the
southern Arabian peninsula, they eventually settled in a place called Senna,
an ancient city in present day Yemen. After many generations in Senna, for
reasons not clear from their traditions, the Lemba migrated again. They
journeyed across the Red Sea into eastern Africa, headed south and
eventually resettled in their present location in modern day South Africa.
They say that: "we came from the north, from a place called Senna. We left
Senna, we crossed Pusela, we came to Africa and there we rebuilt Senna."' 6
The Lemba refuse to eat pig-like animals, practice male circumcision, have
twelve tribes, or clans, and maintain numerous practices that are found
among many Jewish people. Not surprisingly, there were many people who
doubted the veracity of the Lemba's claims.' There is no record of Buba
in written Jewish history, and there is "no shortage of those who
questionably claim to be the sons of Abraham."28
However, despite understandable cynicism, recent DNA analysis
suggests that Lemba oral traditions may be correct. A team of geneticists
has found that many Lemba men carry a set of DNA sequences that are
distinctive of the Jewish cohanim priests believed to be the descendants of
Aaron.29 These researchers discovered this link by examining material from
the Lemba's Y chromosome samples, which are not shuffled every
generation and therefore do not obscure the lines of individual descent
from father to son.30 The genetic signature is also common among
Ashkenazi and Serphardic priests, but is rare or absent in non-Jewish
25 T. Parfitt, Journey to the Vanished City: The Search for the Lost Tribe of Israel (New York:
Vintage Books, 2000).
2 6 N. Wade, "DNA Backs a Tribe's Tradition of Early Descent From Jews" The New York Times
(9 May 1999) 1.
27 See G. Buijs, "Black Jews in the Northern Province: A Study of Ethnic Diversity in South
Africa" (1998) 21 Ethnic and Racial Stud. 661.
28 D. Christy, "A Load of Old Ballistics" The [London] Guardian (16 March 1999) 19.
2 9 Wade, supra note 26. The team of geneticists were Dr. Karl Skorecki, Technion Israel Institute
of Technology; Dr. Michael Hammer, University of Arizona; Neil Bradman, Chair of Centre for
Genetic Anthropology at University College London; David B. Goldstein, population geneticist, Oxford
University, England.
30 There has been an exclusion of outside males among the Lemba which would limit the Y
chromosome additions to the community and may explain why the cohen modal haplotype is so
pervasive within this group, ibid.
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populations What is interesting about Lemba genetic patterns is that the
cohen-associated gene signature is present at the same high rates as found
in the Ashkenazi and Sephardic priests, among men who belong to the
senior of their twelve groups knov as the Buba clan. This discovery has led
to a re-examination of the Lemba's oral traditions regarding their Jewish
ancestry and historic migration to South Africa.
The oral history of the Lemba is, therefore, an important addition
to understanding their society on two different levels. On the one hand, the
tradition may be important evidence of a significant historical migration
that seems to be subject to scientific verification. This conjunction of oral
history and external data demonstrates that there may be instances where
oral history and other methodologies converge and can be used to verify
one another.32 On the other hand, the Lemba's account is also important
because it reveals much about the Lemba's interpretation of their historical
past, which would be the case even if other studies eventually reveal that
their migration and/or Jevwsh ancestry is not historically "true." The fact
that they explain their historical experience and contemporary identity by
reference to their former residence in the middle-east and their adherence
to principles of Judaism, indicates a strong association with its social and
spiritual values. The symbolism, imagination, interpretation, and desire that
can be inferred from Lemba oral traditions provides an historical insight
into their culture that may be as significant, if not more so, than verification
that their journey actually occurred.
IV. SORTING THROUGH THE PAST
This short description of the Lemba's oral history demonstrates that
making use of oral history can be complicated. With the Lemba it seems
31Ibid. Dr. Goldstein has found that 45 percent of Ashkenazi priests and 56 percent of Sephardie
priests have the cohen gene signature, while in Jewish populations in general, the frequency is 3-5 p-r
cent.
32 There have been some attempts to establish the authenticity of Aboriginal traditions through
genetic corroboration. However, the inferences that can be drawn from these studies are incenclusiv.e:
see J.H. Greenburg, C.G. Turner, & S.L Zegura, "The Settlement of the Americas: A Comparison of
the Linguistic, Dental and Genetic Evidence" (19S6) 27 Current Anthropology 477; T.G. Schurr eaL,
"Amerindian Mitochondrial DNA Have Rare Asian Mutations and High Frequcncics, SuggestingThey
Derived from Four Primary Maternal Lineages" (1990) 46 Am. . of Human Genetics 613; M. \Wollaff
in E. Trinkaus, ed., The Enmtgence of Modern Humans: Biccutural Adaptations in ti_ Later Plesarene
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19S9); M. Brown, TheScardiferEve (New York: Harl.-r &
Row, 1990), see especially at 315. Foran interestingoverviewof thisfield,seeJ. Diamond, Geamr, Guns
and Stee" The Fates of Human Societies (New York W.W. Norton, 1997).
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that the past event may have actually occurred, and that the meaning they
attach to this event can also tell us a lot about their identity. What do we
do, however, in cases where we cannot decide if the event described as
having taken place in the past actually happened? What consequences
should follow from our interpretation if it did not? How do we understand
oral tradition when it may sometimes authenticate actual events and
simultaneously provide an interpretation of those events, and at other times
provide an insight into the societies' past collective beliefs, even if the event
described did not really occur. Untangling this thicket is the challenge
historians and courts have been wrestling with as they have attempted to
work with oral tradition.
One approach to this problem is to downplay, disregard, or deny the
utility of oral traditions as providing useful insights into the past. The courts
and early scholars took this traditional approach. While this approach
might make historical reconstruction easier, it does not make it better.
Valuable insights would be lost on those occasions when oral history does
describe a real past event, or reveal a group's psychological understanding
of its past. Another answer to the challenges supplied by oral tradition is to
treat it as a completely different intellectual exercise from conventional
historical work.33 This approach was the official view of the members of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples as they broadly contrasted
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal approaches to history in their final report. 4
3 3 Looking Forward, supra note 11.
3 4 Ibid. at 32-33:
The non-Aboriginal historical tradition in Canada is rooted in western scientific methodology and
emphasizes scholarly documentation and written records. It seeks objectivity and assumes that
persons recording or interpreting events attempt to escape the limitations of their own
philosophies, cultures and outlooks.
In the non-Aboriginal tradition, at least until recently, the purpose of historical study has often
been the analysis of particular events in an effort to establish what 'really' happened as a matter
of objective historical truth or, more modestly, to marshal facts in support of a particular
interpretation of past events.
... Moreover, underlying the western humanist intellectual tradition in the writing of history is the
focus on human beings as the centrepiece of history, including the notion of human progress...This
historical tradition is also secular and distinguishes what is scientific from what is religious or
spiritual, on the assumption that these are two different and separable aspects of the human
experience.
The Aboriginal tradition in the recording of history is neither linear nor s.teeped in the same
notions of social progress and evolution... It is less focused on establishing objective truth and
assumes that the teller of the story is so much a part of the event being described that it would be
arrogant to classify or characterize the event exactly or for all time.
In the Aboriginal tradition the purpose of oral accounts is broader than the role of written history
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The tendency to dichotomize oral and documentary history and treat the
purposes of both enterprises as completely different does have certain
attractions. There is no question that different emphases are broadly
present in Aboriginal versus non-Aboriginal historical traditions. The Royal
Commission labeled these different emphases as documentation, progress,
objectivity, and scientific, on the one hand, and oral, educative, cultural,
socializing, and subjective, on the other. However, I would caution against
over-generalizing the differences between oral and documentary history.
They can be, but are not always, completely different enterprises. A careful
historian, advocate, or judge who works with these materials must
appreciate this fact. Sweeping generalizations about oral and written
histories must be closely scrutinized, and case-by-case analysis must be
supplemented with an awareness of the complex relationship in these
approaches' The similarities between oral and written history are legion.
A significant portion of the documentary record started its life as oral
in western societies. It may be to educate the listener, to communicate aspects of culture, to
socialize people into a cultural tradition, or to 'alidate claims of a particular family to authority
or prestige. Those who hear oral accounts draw their on conclusions from %hat they have heard,
and they do so in the particular context (time, place, and situatton) of the telling. Thu-% the
meaning to be drawn from an oral account dependson wvho is telling it, the circumstances in %%hich
the account is told and the interpretation the listener gives to what has been heard.
Oral accounts of the past include a good deal of subjective experience.
35 Recently, there has been an explosion of materials that treat oral history in a sophisticated
manner, demonstratingcaution against over-generalization and illustratingcarefulease.byca analy-is.
See D.L Fixico, ed., RethinkingAmerican Indian Histon, (Albuquerque: Un iversity of Nwv Mesico Press,
1997); D. McNab & D. Standen, Gin Dos hTlnan DocuncntmgAborginal Histryin Ontario (Toronto:
Champlain Society, 1996) [hereinafter Gin Dos ltlnanl; B. Stoneehild & B. Waiscr, Lay ! TdI Dvath:
Indiansand the North-West Rebellion (Calgary: Fifth House, 1997); D. Hanna& M. Henry. Oar Telhns:
InteiorSalish Storeson theNiha"apinm People (Vancouver: Uni ersityof Britsh Columbia Press, 1996);
H. Foster & A. Grove, "Looking Behind the Masks: A Land Claims Discussion Papzr for Researchers,
Lawyers and Their Employers" (1993) 27 U.B.C.L. Rev. 213; F. Tonkin,NVarrating OurPasc Thr$aobl
Construction of Oral History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); R. Sharpless & D.
Stricklin, eds., The Past Afeets the Present. Essays on Oral Hssteiy (Lanham, MD: University Press of
America, 1985) [hereinafter Past Meets Present]; D. Cohen, The Remapioa M ntain Pcople (Ncw
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974); D. Cohen,FvY. LegaciesPkcvaited(Ne Bruns:,'iekNJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1995); Deadt of Luigisupra note 10; A. Portelli, The Battle of Valle Giutia:
Oral History and the Art of Dialogue (Madison: Uniersity of Wisconsin Press, 1997) [hereinafter Ialle
Giulia]; A. Salmond, Between Worlds: Early Erchanges Belsveen Macri and Eureprans 1773-1815
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997); A. Salmond, Two tl'orlds: FttttMeetingy BeAen Maori
and Europeans 1642-1772 (Honolulu: University of Havaii Press, 1991); J. Binney, RedenptiveSongs:.
A Life of the Nineteenth Century, MaoriLeader TKootiAndarangi (Honolulu: University of Haaii Press,
1997); M. K-Maioloa & B. Burt, Living Tradition: A Changing Life in the So.omon Islands (London:
British Museum Press, 1997); R. Keesing, Custorn and Confrontation: The Kwaao Stru.e far Cultural
Autonomy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); K. Basso, WtemApache Ratding and I ,'afare
(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1971).
20011
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
history.36 This means that each format can encounter similar challenges in
verification and authentication, though this may occur in different ways. 7
Each format may also be subject to substantial revision, permutation, and
change.38 Just as there are different written versions of how and why
Canadian confederation occurred,3 9 SO there are different oral accounts of
how the Ojibway came to live on their traditional territories in southern
Ontario." The diversity of interpretation about these events is not
necessarily a result of the way in which they were transmitted, but instead
reflects the fact that there are different interpreters of history who have
3 6 Written history is often based, in the first instance, on oral history. For example, Herodutus and
Thucydides, the fathers of western history, certainly relied on such sources to create their work. The
writers of the Old and New Testaments and the Muslim hadiths also built their writings on spoken
traditions. What we know about medieval western Europe, through Bede, Gregory of Tours, Paulus
Diaconus, Isidore of Seville, and Widukind, draws most strongly on oral tradition; while the ancient
history of Africa has been largely written over the last fifty years by engaging in oral research. For
further development of these points, see D. Henige, Oral Historiography (New York: Longman, 1982)
at 7-20.
3 7 Vansina, supra note 20 at 186-201.
38 The constructionist nature of historical knowledge means that one cannot study the written
histories of any period or culture without discovering numerous contradictions, permutations, and
changes. SeeJ.W. Meiland, Skepticism and HistoricalKnowledge (New York: Random House, 1965) and
L.J. Goldstein, Historical Knowing (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976). One merely has to become
familiarwith any history to discover the changes and permutations present in these accounts of the past.
There is a somewhat contrary line of thought in the philosophy of history, represented by the idealists,
who suggest that the past can be known with fewer contradictions. R.G. Collingwood perhaps represents
this school of thought's best advocate. He wrote, "the history of thought, and therefore all history, is the
re-enactment of past thought in the historian's own mind," see R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948) at 215. The implication of Collingwood's line of reasoning is
that historical accounts would be more reliable if every historian similarly accessed the context and
thoughts behind past events. Michael J. Oakeshott, another leading philosopher of history, shares a
similar view, see On History and Other Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), but neither scholar would
suggest that history is not rife with contradictions, even if it is because historians fail to properly access
the appropriate thoughts behind past events.
39 A glance through M. Brook Taylor, ed., Canadian History: A Reader's Guide: Beginnings to
Confederation, vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) indicates the range of opinion on this
matter.
40 1 know of three different accounts of how the Ojibway came to occupy their territories in
southern Ontario. One involves their creation near this area, another talks about their migration from
the Atlanticocean, and yet another involves their migration from the Lake Superior area. These various
versions have been described in S. Dewdney, The Sacred Scrolls of the Southern Ojibway (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1975); B. Johnson, Ojibway Heritage (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,
1976) 13-17; G. Copway, supra note 14 at 20; E. Benton Benai, The Mishomis Book: The Voice of the
Ojibway (Hayward, WI: Indian Country Communications, 1988).
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different interests in its reproduction!' If called upon to recount an
important event from our personal or family history, each of us might try
to demonstrate a different aspect of the same event to sustain our
deliberate or unexamined values and beliefs. We may also write with
present values in mind, and pass on both the biases and insights of our
generation.42 We are all socialized and acculturated in different ways. These
various patterns of individual and cultural choice shape how we view the
world. Some people will regard certain influences in historical
development as primary moving forces, while others will take their cues
from very different factors. All historical observation and interpretation,
oral and written, is coloured by differential life experience and training.
While these challenges may be less apparent to those people who are used
to thinking about written history as more trustworthy than oral literacy, it
is important to remember that any view of the past is influenced by the
social and cultural position of those people who engage in its
transmission.4
Given the pervasiveness of western culture in understanding oral
tradition, in the end it may be that people are generally more suspect about
41 Collingwood makes this point throughout his book in his discussion ofvarious historianzmsupra
note 38.
42 B. Croce wrote that all history is modem history.
The practical requirements which underlie every historical judgement give to all history the
character of "contemporary history" because, however remotem time events there recounted may
seem to be, the history in reality refers to both present needs and present situationsv, herein those
events vibrate."
B. Croce, History as the Story of Liberty trans. S. Sprigge (Lnham, MD: University Press of
America, 1990) at 19. EH. Carr also makes this point in his book, lM7wt is Histoy, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Penguin Books, 1990) at 16-20.
43 C. Taylor wrote: "Each one of us has...an understanding from our home culture, and it isWv;en
very deeply into our lives: we don't mainly use it to make people intelligible in theoretical contexts but
to understand and deliberate about our own motives and actions, and those of the people we deal, ith
every day. Indeed, much of our understanding is quite inarticulate; it is in this sense a form of pre-
understanding. It shapes our judgements without our being aware of iL" Philosophical Arumnts
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) at 143-149.
44 R. Gordon & W. Nelson, "An Exchange on Critical Legal Studies" (1933) 6 L and Hist. Rev.
139, see especially at 150. Historical studies of all kinds have this problem because vhat is regarded as
important about the past depends upon the historian's selectivity. E.H. Carr put it this wvay "It used to
be said that facts seak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts spak only when the
historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order and
context." Carr, supra note 42 at 11.
45 E.H. Carr observed: "The historian, then, is an indisidual human b eing. Like other individuals,
he is a social phenomenon, both the product and the conscious or unconscious spokesman of the saciety
to which he belongs;, it is in this capacity that he approaches the historical past," supra note 42 at 35.
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its veracity because it does not accord with prevalent historical and legal
methodologies. When criticizing the use of oral history this fact should
provoke a moment of sober second thought. Giving oral tradition its due
might require examining and partially overturning the values that lie hidden
behind the most pervasive methods of "factual" interpretation. We should
be open to the idea that different cultures may draw their implications
about what happened in the past from different sources. Oral history or
genetic makeup, as illustrated by the Lemba example, could be two such
sources. People have also used pictoglyphs, wampum belts, masks, totem
poles, button blankets, culturally modified environments, birch bark scrolls,
burial disturbances, songs, ceremonies, and stories, to name but a few, to
remember and interpret what happened in the past. Why might we think
writing is always a more reliable basis upon which to take clues about the
past than these other forms of communication?46 Is it because there is a
value system and unexamined bias built into the very process of western
historical and legal interpretation that is often not apparent to those of us
who use it as if it were second nature? Can we be, in some ways, like the
fish that did not ever know about the existence of water, until the first time
it was pulled out into the air?
In examining history one must develop some good general
questions to discern oral tradition's different guises while still being
attentive to its specific context. These inquiries should help one to know
when to consider tradition as proof of past events, when to treat it as
evidence combined with interpretation, and when to regard tradition as
"false" concerning a past occurrence, but "true" because of what it reveals
about the speakers' relationship to their history."47
When I was working with the oral traditions of Cape Croker I
remember wrestling with similar questions. To judge oral tradition as proof
of past events, I looked for a certain degree of consistency within the
accounts and stories I received. I talked to people from different families
on the reserve (Jones, Johnston, Nadjiwon, Akiwenzie). I spoke to people
46 Memory may have certain advantages over writing: "The mind is still the most sophisticated
recording and preserving device that humans have found. Its storage capabilities have not been fully
tested. It is portable, does not need much temperature and humidity control, and is capable of complex
storage, retrieval, and correlation tasks. Knowledge stored in the mind can be transmitted or transferred
to other minds, and that knowledge invests those other minds with abilities to use and understand the
information. Most important, a matter that is kept in mind is also kept in mind. Matters on paper are
more easily stored and forgotten." P. Williams, "Oral Traditions on Trial" in Gin Das Winan,supra note
35 at 30-31.
47Death of Luigi, supra note 10 at 50.
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of different generations (elders, older cousins) and of different but closely
associated communities (Saugeen, Wasauksing, Walpole, Manitoulin). I
also compared these oral accounts with written materials that dealt with the
same events. This was a way of scrutinizing both the oral and written
sources: to show where one or the other may have gaps, errors, or other
deficiencies as proof of past events. In such comparisons it is not always the
case that oral sources are corrected by written sources. At times, oral
tradition may prompt significant revisions to the written record that have
falsely misconstrued a past occurrence. In order to test the traditions I
received for this kind of proof, I searched family histories, scholarly works,
graduate theses, missionary journals, Indian agency correspondence,
surveyors notes, band council minutes, newspaper articles, individuals'
private papers, "explorers" travel maps and books, and government census
material. 4
Yet, this testing of tradition was not only for the purpose of
verifying the existence of certain past events. As illustrated in the example
of my great-great grandfather's treaty making exercise, of even greater
importance for the history I was compiling was the historical meaning that
our people applied to the treaty-making event. The "facts" of my
community's legal, psychological, emotional, and spiritual relationship to
the events that had taken place was what interested me. Testing the "truth"
of this historical evidence required further tools. I needed to be familiar
with the hopes, fears, aspirations, and self-perceived limits people held. I
needed to know their priorities, relationships, landscape, physical needs,
and desires. My ancestry, family relationship, friendships, personal
viewpoints, and student status were also helpful in this regard. I would have
been even better equipped to understand their interpretation of history had
I known more of the Ojibway language, and spent even more time in the
community as a youth.
Another tool helpful for understanding my community's oral
histories was an ability to give something valuable back to those who ,were
speaking to me. The dialogical nature of oral history reveals the researcher
as a participant in the creation of historical meaning, despite attempts to
"tread lightly" and not interfere with the informant's memory. As hard as
I tried, it was impossible for me to hide behind a fagade of objectivity when
I interacted with others in the interviews and thereby became involuntarily
48 Genealog" of Law, supra note 1.
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complicit in the structure of their narratives.49 In many respects, an
interviewer implicitly defines the roles of the parties and establishes the
basis of narrative by opening the conversation. My seemingly neutral
requests would shape the agenda and form of the interview, and thereby
influence its chronology, themes, subject matter, and style.50 Fortunately,
these agendas were constantly subject to renegotiation throughout the
interview as the informant and I unconsciously tussled with one another
over the significance, hypothesis, analysis, and assumptions that structured
our interaction. 5t Nevertheless, the fiction of non-interference in such
interactions was hard to sustain when the very process of inquiry shaped the
understanding of oral history.52 Therefore, my active and often not too
hidden role in the construction of the narrative made another tool very
valuable for understanding oral history. The ability to give something
significant in return throughout the interview could establish a better
understanding of the events under study. If I could draw on my knowledge
to ask more specific questions, challenge responses, listen patiently to so-
called tangents, better answer questions that were put to me, and thereby
further draw on the interviewee's memory, this could play an important role
in understanding the informant's history. Furthermore, any limited ability
I later marshaled to communicate this history also became an important
tool that gave something back to the people who spoke to me. I felt that if
I could provide an opportunity for people to organize their knowledge
more articulately, amplify their voices by bringing them to a wider
audience, and extend their narrative's life by prolonging access to it, this
activity could be a valuable tool that helped in understanding oral history."
The questions and qualities that make oral history more
intellectually accessible are available to researchers, lawyers, and
decisionmakers who want to understand its particular truths. They assist in
discerning the different "facts" that oral history might record. They can
help in sorting through the past and making sense of oral history's
sometimes shifting purposes. External testing and documentary
triangulation shed light on the "factual" occurrence of past events. Internal
cross-referencing reveals the "factual" truth of the community's perception
49"Remembering in an interview is a mutual process, which requires understanding on both
sides," Thompson, supra note 12 at 157.
Valle Giulia, supra note 35 at 11-12.
51 Past Meets Present, supra note 35 at 12.
52 E. Tonkin, supra note 35 at 1-4.
53 Ibid. at 67-69.
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of the past through the researcher's relationship to the peoples' kmowledge
under study. Keeping these tools in mind might help those researchers
interested in using oral history to understand actual past events, peoples'
interpretations of the past (even when the events on which they based their
historical understanding did not occur), and the distinctions that may
sometimes need to be made betw-een them.
V. ORAL HISTORY IN THE COURTS
Similar to my experiences with Aunt Irene, and to other challenges
discussed in this article, the difficulties present in understanding oral
tradition have been encountered in the context of courtroom practice and
jurisprudential principle.! Through the years, Aboriginal oral history has
led judges to label Indigenous peoples as, among other things, "ignorant,SS
"cprimitive," 56 "untutored,' ' 7 "savage, '-s "crude.. .simple, uniformed and
54 One backhanded example of the bias against Aboriginal peoples and their capacity to prop.erly
give evidence is found in an earlyBriidl Columbia EidenceAc thatvwas only repealed in 1963. This Act
permitted ajudge to receive evidence from an Aboriginal person onlyasa matterofdisction, as it.as
implicitly assumed that otherwise such a person's testimony would be suspect and unreliablc. The Act
read "...it shall be lawful for any Court...in the discretion of such Court...to receive e-idenc of any
Aboriginal, Native, or Native of the haliblood, of the Continent of North America, or the Islands
adjacent thereto, being an uncivilized person, destitute of the kno-Jedge of God, and of any fixd and
clear belief in religion or in a future state of rewards and punishments, without administering the usual
form of oath to any such Aboriginal Native orNative of the half-blood..." S.B.C. IE, -41, s.1, asrep.
by S.B.C. 1963, c 16, s. 2. While this statute was presumably considered to be a liberal and generous
provision in favour of Aboriginal people, in that it permitted the reception of their evidence, it is
anythingbut liberal when one realizesthat it was premised on a racistLiewofAboriginalspiritualityand
cultural development. Aboriginal peoples have often confronted suchviewsconcerning their intellectual
disposition and capacity when dealing with common law values and principles For further general
commentaryon oral evidence in trial, see D. Opekokew,"A Reiewof EthnocentrieBiasFacinglndian
Witnesses" in R. Gosse, J. Y. Henderson & R. Carter, eds., Continuing Pe:ndmaker and Rie s Quest
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1994) 192.
55 Beecherv. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 440,441 (187).
56 Calder v. A.G.B.C (1990), 13 D.LR. (3d) 64 at 64 (B.C.C.A.). Chief Justice Davey %,,as
upbraided for this comment by Justice Hall of the Supreme Court of Canada ,ho wrote, "in so saying
this in 1970, he was assessing the Indian culture of 1858 by the same standards Europeans applied to
the Indians of North America two or more centuries before," ibid. [19731 S.C.R. 313 at 347.
57R. v. Syliboy (1929), 1 D.L.R. 307 at 315 (N.S.Co.CL). In reference to this label, Chief Justice
Dickson observed that "such language is no longer acceptable in Canadian law and, indeed, is
inconsistent with a growving sensitivity to native rights in Canada;'&. v. Siman, [19351 2 S.C.R. 337 at
399.
58 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (S Wheat.) 543; E Porte Crow Dql169 U.S. 556.
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inferior people,"5 9 who led lives that were "nasty, brutish and short."6 Yet
despite these biases, in recent years the oral traditions of Canada's First
Nations have played an increasingly "crucial role in the litigation of
Aboriginal rights."6 t In numerous cases oral histories have been brought
before the courts in an attempt to prove long-standing relationships
between Indigenous peoples and their environments.62 Aboriginal litigants
have presented this evidence in the hope that courts would attach legal
significance to these ancient relationships and thereby provide protection
for them in their traditional territories. In some cases there has been
scholarly and legal recognition of the connection between oral tradition,
scientific study, and the actual occurrence of past events. In others there
have been some difficulties in discerning the complexities of oral history
that has led to questions concerning its admissibility and weight as proof of
past events.63 One of the challenges the courts face in dealing with oral
history is that they have not traditionally given much credence to the other
truths that may be present in oral history."
This traditional approach may be changing in light of the ground
breaking case of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,65 in which the Supreme
Court of Canada partially acknowledged the problems associated with the
interpretation of oral history. The Court wrote that a "special approach"
was required in receiving and interpreting evidence from Aboriginal
claimants where such evidence "does not conform precisely with the
59 United States v. Sandoval, 34 S.Ct. I (U.S.S.C.).
6 0 Delgamuukwv.A.G.B.C. (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) at 268.
61 Delgamuukw v. B.C., [19971 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw (S.C.C.)).
62 Some notable cases considering Aboriginal oral evidence are Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.
(1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 (S.C. N. Terr.); Re Paulette and Registrar of Ties (No.2) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d)
8 (N.W.T.S.C.); Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of IndianAffairs and Northern Development (1979), 102
D.L.R. (3d) 513 (F.C.T.D.); R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 360 (C.A.); R. v. Simon,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 387; Attorney General for Ontario v. Bear Island Foundation, (1984) 49 O.R. (2d) 353;
Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 107 A.L.R. 1 (H.C. Aust); R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507
[hereinafter Van der Peet]; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; Delgamuukv (S.C.C.), ibid., Mitchell v.
MNR [2001] S.C.R. 33.
63 For a good discussion of the challenges presented to courts on the admissibility and weight of
Aboriginal evidence, see B. Gover & M. Locke Macaulay, "Snow Houses Leave No Ruins: Unique
Evidence Issues in Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Cases" (1996) 60 Sask. L. Rev. 47.
64 There are some exceptions to the courts mistreatment of Aboriginal history. Oral testimony,
necessarily hearsay in character, will be accepted from an Indian witness asprimafacie proof that lands
are Indian lands, and that they have never been ceded to the Crown. R. v. Strong (1850) 1 Or. 392
(U.C.Ch.) at 404-06.
65 Delgramuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 61.
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evidentiary standards" that would be applied in private law cases.'5 The
differential treatment of Aboriginal evidence was justified by the suigeneris
categorization of Aboriginal rights, which recognizes their unique source
and nature.67 The Court reasoned that "although the doctrine of aboriginal
rights is a common law doctrine, aboriginal rights are truly suigeneris, and
demand a unique approach to the treatment of evidence which accords due
weight to the perspective of aboriginal peoples."' To apply this principle,
the Court instructed judges to adapt the laws of evidence so that
Aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and traditions and on
their relationship with the land, are given due weight.'9 This approach
allows a judicial decisionmaker to give oral histories "independent weight"
and place them "on an equal footing with the types of historical evidence
that courts are familiar with.""0 The Court noted that these modifications
66 Delgamuith (S.C.C.), ibid. at 1065, per Justice Lamer. quoting lKan dcr Poet, supra note 62 at
559. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada, in other circumstances, has aLco
affirmed the importance of not mechanically applying the so.called ex~ception to hearsay evidence vihen
circumstantial probabilitywarrants its admission: see R. v. Klzan. [19901 2$.CR. 531; R. v. Snut, [12
2 S.C.R. 915. The Supreme Court has also extolled the virtues of oral history more generally, and cen
written that this history contains "unwritten norms" that "stretch back through the agesr and "inform
and sustain" Canada's highest legal document, the Canadian Constitution, see the Reference Re
Secession of Quebec, 1199812 S.C.R. 217 at 239-40,247,249.
67Delgamuuktv (S.C.C.),ibid. at 1066, perJustice Lamer. Forcommentaryon thesgcnoris nature
of Aboriginal rights, see J. Borrows & LI. Rotman, "The Sm Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights;
Does it Make a Difference?" (1997) 36 Alta. L Rev. 9.
6S Deigarauukt (S.C.C), ibid.
69 Ibid. at 1067, per Justice Lamer. In this regard the Chief Justice also wrote that "courts must
not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal claimants...simplybecause that evidence dozs not
conform precisely with the evidentiary standards" in priate law cases, b. at f55.
70 Ibid. at 1069. It should be noted that the Court's adaptation of c,.identiay standards finds
parallels elsewhere in the jurisprudence. In the mid-ISth century, the courts drastically changed the
rules of evidence to receive commercial and merchant customs and eWidence for' irtually the first time.
The Delgamua;k case has been criticized by many in the business community for the new "uncertain"
evidentiary standards it creates. It is interesting and somev.hat ironic to note that the foundation of lav'
protecting commercial transactionswasas revolutionaryin its time as the Dd5,7muuJ wcase may app ar
today.
M.H. Ogilvie, Historical Introduction to LegalStudies (Carta ell: Toronto, 1932) at 345 noted the
radical evidentiary changes required to receihe commercial customs into the common law as follo;'s
"Lord Mansfield can rightly be claimed to be the greatest chief justice in the common law and his
influence on numerous branches of law is still felt today. He also incorporated the law merchant into
the common law by ignoring the traditional procedural rules of the King's Bench so as to allow for the
expert evidence on mercantile practice heard by specially selected juries of commercial men from the
City. Moreover, he did not feel compelled to equate the law merchant with feudal property or to
reinterpret it in that light, rather he accepted the eWidence and adopted it into the body of the common
law, transforming it into common or judge-made law at the same time:' Man-field's groundbreakng
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to the rules of evidence were necessary to the litigation of Aboriginal rights
if to do otherwise would "impose an impossible burden of proof on
Aboriginal peoples, and render nugatory any rights they have" because
"most Aboriginal societies did not keep written records.""1
The attempted reconciliation of "the perspective of Aboriginal
people" with "the perspective of the common law" found in these new
evidentiary standards is an important development in the Court's
articulation of principles to bridge the differences between Aboriginal and
non-Aboriginal cultures.72 While the Court's new approach to oral history
might have solved the old problems of not giving credence to these
histories, in the process the Court may have created new challenges. It is
not yet clear how the courts will sort through and discern the shifting
purposes of oral history explored in this article. Distinguishing between the
various purposes and uses of oral history is not an easy task. The Court is
now peering over this new horizon by allowing oral histories to be received
on the same footing as conventional histories. How they will deal with the
challenge of placing Aboriginal oral tradition on the same footing with the
types of evidence the courts are familiar with is an important question. Will
they be equipped or mindful of the difficulties presented by the
interpretation of oral history?
There are elements of Delgamuukw that raise questions about the
Court's knowledge of what it has embarked upon, which deserve outlining
here. In particular, after encouraging the accommodation of unique
evidence from Aboriginal peoples, the Court wrote that this reconciliation
must not be done in a manner that "strains the Canadian legal and
constitutional structure." 73 This caveat, while intended to be reassuring,
represents a substantial challenge for the reception of oral history in a
manner that is sensitive to its different purposes. It may one day represent
the fulcrum on which the courts once again elevate non-Aboriginal values
and modes of historical interpretation, despite their intent to do otherwise.
This new problem may present itself because the Court's new test for
Aboriginal oral history will probably strain (though not break) Canada's
treatment of evidence in commercial law sounds like Lamer's treatment of Aboriginal evidence in
Delgamuukw.
71 Ibid., quoting from R. v. Simon, [198512 S.C.R. 387 at 408.
72 Delgamuukw (S.C.C.), supra note 61 at 1066.
73 Ibid.
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legal and constitutional structure.74 Any failure to recognize this difficulty
misapprehends the nature and purposes of Aboriginal oral history.
The mere presentation of Aboriginal oral evidence often questions
the very core of the Canadian legal and constitutional structure. In many
parts of the country certain oral traditions are most relevant to Aboriginal
peoples because they keep alive the memory of their unconscionable
mistreatment at the hands of the British and Canadian legal systems. Their
evidence records the "fact" that the unjust extension of the common law
and constitutional regimes often occurred through dishonesty and
deception, and that the loss of Aboriginal land and jurisdiction happened
against their will and without their consent." These traditions include
memories7  of the government's deception, "3 lies," theft13  broken
promises,"a unequal and inhumane treatment, '2 suppression of language" 3
74For my comments on the durability of Canada's legal structure in the face of injutc to
Aboriginal peoples, see J. Borrows, "Sovercignty's Alchcm) A Comment on Dcl;dmurLtv %, T1he
Queen" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L J. 537.
75 Ibid.
76 There are many accounts of the mistreatment endured by Aboriginal F.tvples at the hand3 of
colonial governments. A good overview is found in Lc'!aw Fermard, supra note I I at 245-590
77The footnotes that followin this sentence record Aboriginal histoncal elenences that can3l a5
be verified through witten sources.
7SAboriginal peoples remember that civil servants charged with protecting their rights, often
deceived them in verycostlyvays. Foran example, see the factsof GucminR , [19.4 S.C.R 335 For
an excellent study about deception in CanadiantAbonginal relations, 5ce S.M. \Weaer, a21',
Canadian Indian Poliy: The Hidden Agnda 1963-1970 (Toronto: Unter:ity of Torento Press, lQl
79 H. Cardinal, The Unjust Socidy: The Tragedy ,f Canada's Indians lEdmontom MG Hurtix,
1969) at 27-50.
Many Aboriginal people remember the theft of their mask, totem pies, button blantet%,
carvings, medicine bundles, land, and their ancestors bone-. For a non-,Atranginal account that cites
many Aboriginal sources, see generally, R. Wright, Stolen C'tntntts' Tie N., llorld Thre wji Irlnin
Eves (Toronto: Penguin, 1993).
S1 See P. Chartrand,"Aboriginal Rights: The Diposer -ion of the Mtis7' ( 19)l 29 OK ;cah Hall
L J. 457. Almost everymajor Indian treatyalso has unfulfilled promises. se CanadaE vtoft:oR ,l
Commission on Aboriginal PeopL" Restructuring the RclatcnmT p, % ol. 2 (Ottawa, Supply and S%t.:e'.,
1996), see especially c. 2. Specific examples of the court's r-rmitting the Crow n to break its promr2s
are found inA.G. of Canada v.A.G. of Ontario (sub nom. Re Indian Clauns) [ 197] AC. 19) at 213, R,
v. Sikyea, [1964] S.C.R. 642.
82 Aboriginal people who fought in the wars received disturbingly unequal treatment ,hen they
returned home, see F. Gaffen, Forgotten Soldiers (Penticton, B C: Theytus Boas, 1935), Ab irilnal
peoples have also been treated unequally and inhumanely in Canadas criminal law sisem, .se Royal
Commission on Aboriginal People, Bridging te Cultural Di;zde A Report on Abon7inal Pcz,-!o ansd
Criminal Justice in Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Serices. 6). The Supreme Court of Canada has
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 39, NO. I
repression of religious freedoms,' restraint of trade and economic
sanctions, 85 denial of legal rights," suppression of political rights,87 forced
physical relocation,"8 and plunder and despoliation of traditional
territories. 9 As such, oral tradition is controversial because it potentially
undermines the law's claim to legitimacy throughout the country due to the
illegality and/or unconstitutionality of past actions.
However, oral tradition may also be contentious on other grounds.
Besides challenging the law's underlying legitimacy, it can simultaneously
assert an alternative structure of legitimate normative order. The Court
may not have contemplated this aspect of oral tradition when commenting
commented on the current "crisis" this treatment has spawned in R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688.
83 D.A. Nock, A Victorian Missionary and Canadian Indian Policy: Cultural Synthesis vs Cultural
Replacement (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1988) at 40,78; G. Manuel & M. Posluns, The
Fourth World: An Indian Reality (Don. Mills, Ont.: Collier-Macmillan, 1974) at 67. For personal
anecdotes that keep alive the effect of this treatment, see C. Haig-Brown, Resistance and Renewal:
Surviving the Indian Residential School (Vancouver: Tillacum Library, 1988) at 53-87.
See K. Pettipas, Severing the Tes That Bind: Government Repression of Indigenous Religious
Ceremonies on the Prairies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1994).
85 For a history of restraint on trade encountered on the prairies, see S. Carter, Lost Harvests:
Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
1990). For a history of the sanctions Aboriginal peoples suffered in the west coast fishing trade, see D.
Newell, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in Canada's Pacific Coast Fisheries (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1993).
86 In 1927 the federal government made it illegal to raise money to pursue land claims without
government approval, see Indian Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 98, s. 149; for commentary see P. Tennant,
Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia, 1849-1989 (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 1990) at 111-113.
8 7 The federal government attempted to forcibly replace the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council
at Six Nations with an elected band council, and the courts later upheld this action, see Logan v. Styres
(1959) 20 D.L.R. (2d) 416 (Ont. H.C.). The federal government similarly suppressed west coast political
structures by outlawing the potlatch. For a description and commentary, see D. Cole & I. Chaikin, An
Iron Hand Upon the People: The Law Against the Potlatch on the Northwest Coast (Vancouver: Douglas
& McIntyre, 1990).
88 Whole communities suffered resettlement. For example, see The High Arctic Relocation: A
Report on the 1953-1955 Relocation (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1994). For information about further
relocations, see Looking Forward, supra note 11 at 411-543. Individuals were also forceably relocated
through residential schools and provincial child welfare regimes, see A.C. Hamilton & C.M. Sinclair,
The Justice System and Aboriginal People: Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry in Manitoba, vol. I
(Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1991) at 509-520.
89 1. Spry, "The Tragedy of the Loss of the Commons in Western Canada" in A.L. Getty & A.S.
Lussier, eds., As Long as the Sun Shines and the Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1983) at 203; J. Goddard, Last Stand of the Lubicon
Cree (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991).
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on it in Delgamuukw. In many places Aboriginal law continues to exist as
an important source of legal authority,"' even if it has been weakened in
some cases through the unjust imposition of alien structures."' A number
of Aboriginal groups assert that their law remains paramount in their lives,
and that colonial legal structures have not extinguished their legal
structures.93 While they acknowledge that their law may be encumbered by
Canadian law they contend that Indigenous lawv stems from an independent
source of authority and does not depend upon executive, legislative, or
judicial recognition to have force over their people. " To the extent that oral
tradition encompasses these views, it presents a strong vision of legal
pluralism that the Supreme Court has not yet fully embraced?9
For example, much of the evidence recited in the Delgamuukw case
not only provided information that supported the Githsan's and
Wet'suvet'en's historic use and occupation of their territories, but also
contained a competing jurisprudential narrative that potentially strained
Canada's claim to legal exclusivity in the area.> The Court did not strongly
acknowledge the binary nature of this testimony, which comprised both a
90 Ddgamuuk-w (S.C.C), supra note 61.
91 The continued eistence of Aboriginal law as an important Eource of authority is illustrated in
ConnoI4 v. Moolch (1367), 17 R.LR.Q. 75 (Que. S.C.); R. v. Nan.c-quis.a.La (1,$9), I Terr. LR- 211
(N.W.T. Sup.Ct.); R. v. Bear's Shin Bone (1S99), 3 CC. 329 (N.V.,S C ); Re: AdvtIian of Natia
(1961), 32 D.LR. (2d) 6S6 (N.W.T.T.C.); Aitchoe.7l4 v. Tuc!joo (1972), 23 D.LR, (3d) 203
(N.W.T.C.A.), (sub nom. Re Deborah); Michell v. Dennis, [19341 2 C.N.LR. 91 (B CSC.); Cas .nc
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia (1993), 106 D.LR. (4th) 720 (B.C.C.A); I dcle v. 1tcd (1)21, 93
D.LR. (4th) 318 (Alta. Prov. Ct.); I'an der Pesupra note b2;Deiganmu!. (S.CC.),supra note 61.
92 For a discussion of how the imposition of non-Aboriginal structures have veakencd but not
destroyed Aboriginal authority, see Genealog ofLan,. supra note 1.
For a sample of this opinion, see Grand Chief M. Mitchell, "An Unbroken As:2 rtion of
Sovereignty" in B. Richardson, ed., Drumbeat: Anger and Rene.al in Indian Can:mtn (Toronow
Summerhill Press, 1989) at 105-136; F. Cassidy, ed.. Abon,,al Slf.Detcrmn-atton (Lantz lle, B C,;
0olichan Books, 1991) at 33-62; 0. Merredi & M.E. Tu r Q1, In the RaPt ,s: N jatm3 tre ft re of
First Nations (Toronto: Viking Books, 1993) at 13-36.
94 In this they have some support from the Supreme Court of Canada, v.ho termed mdt, yCCu&
laws "pre-esisting," having their source prior to the asscrtion of Britih s5ereignty. De,'; n;uu .
(S.C.C.), supra note 61 at 1032-92, quoted from flan der Peet. supra note 62 at 53S.
95 However, the Court has accepted a weaker ersion of Indigenous legal plurahsm, sEe 117n dcr
Peet, supra note 62 at 533, 545-46.547; Deganuulav (S.C.C, sup-a note 61 at 103 -11CG3 (i)-110,
1105-1106. For further commentary, see J. Borrov.s, "With or Without You* Firlt Nations La. (an
Canada)" (1996) 41 McGill L J. 629 [hereinafter"\Vith or Without You"].
A. Mills, Eagle Donn is Our Law: ftsunitlaz Law, Fcasq, and Land Claims (Vaneouzer.
University of British Columbia Press, 1994).
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"subjective and evaluative" aspect and a "scientific and objective aspect."97
Some of the most striking evidence of this type was the recitation at trial of
Gitksan adaawk and Wet'suwet'en kungax. The adaawk and kungax are
unwritten collections of important history, legends, laws, rituals, and
traditions of Gitksan or Wet'suwet'en House organizations. They speak of
these peoples' proprietary rights and responsibilities in the disputed
territories and they tell of Indigenous legal regimes that govern
relationships in their homelands. The adaawk and kungax are something
to be evaluated and something to evaluate by. However, the courts in this
case only saw the adaawk and kungax as something to be judged (and then
only barely), and did not view them as legal standards that would assist in
making ajudgement. The courts could or would not see or accept the "fact"
that Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en oral tradition challenges Canada's
monopoly on law in their territories, since such recognition might
presumably strain the Canadian legal and constitutional structure. This
reluctance illustrates one large difficulty with the Supreme Court's notion
that Aboriginal evidence must accede to Canadian legal and constitutional
standards because Aboriginal traditions will often necessarily strain
Canada's legal system-they can be part of another culture's evaluative
system of law. To deny such testimony when it potentially strains Canada's
legal and constitutional structure will ensure that Aboriginal oral history is
subordinated to other historical and legal methodologies. Accordingly,
Aboriginal peoples will also be subordinated in the process.
Unless the Court is willing to change its entire approach to the
reception, interpretation, and use of evidence, it may not be able to
implement effectively its call to accommodate Aboriginal oral history on an
equal footing to other forms of evidence. Aside from the fact that this
evidence might sometimes be properly regarded as law, there are still other
problems. For example, the Court's modified test for Aboriginal evidence
must still be received and evaluated by people within a structure and
institution that often has a very different ideological and cultural
orientation from most Aboriginal peoples' traditions. This requirement
creates problems for the courts in evaluating what is factual across cultures,
and raises a host of issues around oral history's sometimes shifting
purposes. The leading historiographer of oral tradition, Jan Vansina, has
For example, a Gitksan tradition of a supernatural event of a giant bear coming down a
mountain corroborates geological evidence of a land slide in the same valley which is the subject of the
story. See Delgamuukw v.A.G.B.C., supra note 60, per Justice McEachern.
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observed that "all messages are a part of a culture."' In his seminal work,
Vansina wrote that messages "are expressed in the language of a culture
and conceived, as well as understood, in the substantive terms of a
culture."99 He concluded that since culture shapes all messages, culture
must be taken into account -hen interpreting these messages. This is a
challenging proposition, since what constitutes a fact is largely contingent
on the language and culture out of which that information arises.*3 The
people who decide the "fact" are inexorably defined from vthin the matrix
of relationships they share with others."'
There are enormous risks for non-apprehension and
misinterpretation when Aboriginal peoples submit their "facts" to the
judiciary for interpretation." This problem is especially poignant in
litigation as factual determinations are presented in an adversarial
environment,'03 and interpretations made by judges with a different
language, cultural orientation, and experiential background than aboriginal
people.'O' The potential for misunderstanding exists because each culture
has somewhat different perceptions of space, time, historical truth, and
causality.' The cultural specificity of what constitutes a fact in one culture
9S Vansina, stpra note 20 at 124.
99 Ibd. See also J. Cruikshank, "Oral Tradition and Oral Histor Re c mg Some lss"c ( 1A)
75 Can. Hist. Rev. 403.
160 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd cd, trans. G.E N1, Anomb2e (Ncv, Yeor%
Macmillan, 1953) at 60f. He wrote that meaningand understanding of a fact is"kno;, mg ha; to g on,"
If you do not have an understanding of "how to go on" in a culture that is diffcrcnt from yaur e.,n, au
do not know the facts of that culture.
101 M. Heidegger, Being and Tune, trans. J. Macquarric and E. Rebirmn INca York. Har:r&:
Row, 1962) at 157.
102 R. Rorty, "On Ethnocentrism: A Reply to Clifford Gccrtt' ( lOqbti 25 Mch Q, Re%. Il5,A
An-Na'im, "Problems of Universal Cultural Legitimacy for Human Right' in A.A An.Na'im i4 F
Deng, eds., Human Rights in .tfrica: Crss-Cuttural Pcrt-cati cs (Washing.n, Breqhmin- lnqitutwn.
1990) 331.
103 For the special challenges of presenting history in an ad er'anal courtroum cnvironmcnt, ,Cc
D. J. Bourgeois, "The Role of the Historian in the Litigation Preccs;' !l'f} 67 Can. Ho.t Re% l9,
G.M. Dickinson & R.D. Gidney.;Histomy and Adocac: Sm Refilectiowon tlte HitortanslteR in
Litigation" (19S7) 6S Can. Hist. Rev. 576; Vansina,supra rknte 20 at 102-103.
104 R. Devlin, "Judging and Diversity: Justice or Just Us?" (1996) 2033 Prw.. Ct Judges J, 4.
105 For eample, in spatial terms, early Christians 'isahized the Garden of Eden as bt.=g in
Mesopotamia and thus attempted to explain all human migration assotmehw,.wftcmmgfrom this prnt
In contrast, many Ojibay people trace their origin to Michilimacknac IlMand in the Great l.akcs and
reference their migrations from this place. Temporally spealang, Chnstianity, ' !am, and Judat:m hae
tended to view time as being linear, progressing, and "marchigon. Other cultures, such as the Maya,
30 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 39, NO. I
may make it difficult for a person from a different culture to accept the
same information as a fact."° Since variations between groups help to
encode "facts" with different meanings within each culture, t" collective
perceptions of these notions must be viewed through the lens of the culture
that recorded them to be properly understood.
Therefore, judges who evaluate the meaning, relevance, and weight
of the Aboriginal evidence must appreciate the potential cultural
differences in the implicit meanings behind the explicit messages if they are
going to draw appropriate inferences and conclusions from this data. t"
They should attempt to comprehend the unspoken symbolic aspects of
these messages to evaluate their veracity and value. Mastering both these
facets of interpretation is a tremendously difficult and complex task. Many
judges simply may not be equipped to perform this role without further
training, even in cases where the best of intentions and will is present. Each
culture has its own shared imagery that conveys meaning and emotional
impact, as found in metaphors, stock phrases, stereotypes, and other
cliches.'" It is important to understand the particular imagery of a culture
as contained in these forms in order to appreciate "the context of meaning"
behind oral evidence.10 Without this deeper knowledge, Canadian judges
will have an especially difficult time understanding and acknowledging the
meanings Aboriginal people give to the facts they present."' This
Ainu, or Cree, have thought of time as being cyclical and repetitive. Causality or change can also differ
between groups. See Vansina, supra note 20 at 125-133.
106 Vansina has written that "[hlistorical truth is also a notion that is culture specific," ibid. at 129.
107 C. Taylor, "Understanding and Ethnocentricity," in Philosophy and the Human Science:
Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) at 119-121. Vansina states
that since "culture can be defined aswhat is common in the minds of a given group of people;.. .[pleople
in a community share many ideas, values and images.. .which are collective to them and differ from
others," Vansina, ibid. at 124.
108A leading ethnohistorian wrote: "Historical records can be interpreted only when the cultural
values of both the observer and the observed are understood by the historian. In the study of modei n
Western history, the experience of everyday life may suffice to supplysuch knowledge. Yet this implicit
approach does not provide an adequate basis for understanding the behavior of people in earlier times
or in cultures radically different from our own." Trigger, supra note 14 at 168.
109 Vansina, supra note 20 at 124.
0ibid. at 137.
L. Mandell, "Native Culture on Trial" in S. Martin & K. Mahoney, eds., Equality and Judical
Neutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) 358; J. Ryan & B. Ominayak, "The Cultural Effects of Judicial
Bias" ibid. at 346; R. Ridington, "Cultures in Conflict: The Problem of Discourse" in W.H. New, ed.,
Native Writers and Canadian Writing: Canadian Literature Special Issue (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1990) 273.
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evaluation will be especially fraught With danger if the interpreter does not
recognize the cultural foundation of knowledge, and acknowledge personal
bias.112 If such recognition does not occur, there will be great difficulties for
Aboriginal peoples in Canadian courts receiving and evaluating their
evidence "because judges, like all other humans, operate from their own
perspectives."" 3
The difficulty of interpretation speaks to the need, when hearing
this so-called evidence, to have the assistance of Aboriginal elders, judges,
anicus curiae, or skilled counsel Imowledgeable in the traditions, laws, and
cultures of Canadian and Indigenous legal systems." 4 Unless this happens,
Aboriginal oral history runs the risk of being "undervalued"" because the
"Aboriginal perspective on their practices, customs and traditions and on
their relationship with the land" may not be given "due weight.""'
Aboriginal peoples need to continue, as they have done for millennia, to be
involved in the creation, control, and change of their own worlds through
the power of language, stories, and songs. It is vital that they participate in
the interpretation of their traditions, if they are going to bring them before
the courts. This engagement is important because the court's words "do not
merely represent meaning, but possess the power to change reality itself'
as judicial consideration of Aboriginal history Will shape aboriginal peoples'
legal, economic, political, and socio-cultural relationships." 7 Unless
112 Anthropologist Robin Ridington observed these problemsin the factual undpinnn-of the
trial judge's decision in Delgainuu-. See R. Ridington. "Fxcldvork in Courtrom 53. A WitaeF3 to
Delgamuukw" in F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in ritish Cohmlb.z: d,',;rntw u k Tie Quccn
(Montreal: Institute for Public Policy, 1992) 206 at 211-12. For further commentary on the htstenaal
and cultural assumptions of Chief Justice McEachern's decision in Dd amuf.w.s See: J. Fortune,
"Construing Delgamuukw: Legal Arguments. Historical Argumentation, and the PhilodophyofHitor"
(1993) 51 U.T. Fac. L Rev. S0; M. Asch & C. Bell, "Definition and Interpretation of Fact in Canadian
Aboriginal Title Legislation: An Analysis of Delgamuuk'-w" (1994) 10 Queen's L J. 503; G. Sherrott,
"The Court's Treatment of the Evidence in Delgamuukv v. B.C." (1992) 56 Sa'k. L Rev, 441-
113 A v. S.(RD.), 11997] 3 S.C.R. 4S4 at 504 [hereinafterS.IRD.J, par Justices LHcuretx-Dub5
and McLachlin. Justices L'Heureux-Dub6 and Justice McLachfin similarly wrote that "judges in a
bilingual, multiracial and multicultural societyN, ill undoubtcdlyapproach the task of judging from their
various perspectives. They will certainly hase been shapzd by, and hase gained insght from, their
different experiences, and cannot be expected to dnorcL thcmseles from these exspriences on the
occasion of their appointment to the bench," ibid. at 505.
114 "With or Without You,"s.upra note 95.
Hs Dedganuukw (S.C.C.).supra note 61 at 1065, quoted from I'in dcrI'cei, isura note 62 at 559.
116 Delganuiukt, ibid. at 1067, per Justice Lamer.
P. Petrone, Native Literature in Canada: From the Oral Tradtwan to the Prescnt fToronto-
Oxford University Press, 1990) at 9-10.
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Aboriginal peoples more strongly participate in the future interpretation
of these narratives in the Canadian judicial system, the process and purpose
of Aboriginal oral history may not be appropriately accommodated, despite
the best efforts of the judiciary. This loss might occur for Indigenous
peoples because the language and culture of law will not really be their
own, 11 as the legal interpretation of their traditions and history is
centralized and administered by non-Aboriginal people. 19 Aboriginal
peoples need to participate more fully in the administration of this
system-and at times be in positions of control- to overcome this danger.
The Court's instruction to adapt the laws of evidence to incorporate
Aboriginal factual perspectives may not be realized unless this occurs.
A final problem that Aboriginal people may encounter in
reconciling their evidence with Canadian constitutional and legal structures
concerns the treatment of Aboriginal elders at the hands of some lawyers
and judges. Unless substantial reform occurs, this may also create individual
challenges for those people presenting their traditions, and may raise
problems for the community. Aboriginal elders frequently have to endure
questioning and procedures that are inconsistent with their status in their
communities. The wisdom they have attained and the struggles they have
endured in acquiring this knowledge demand that they be shown the highest
honour and deepest respect. While there is no doubt that presenting
evidence in an adversarial setting is a harrowing experience for most
people,120 this can be especially troubling for elders from certain groups
where such treatment would be tantamount to discrediting their reputation
and standing in the community. No one likes to be aggressively cross-
examined, but the results are not the same for every person who
experiences this procedure. Elders who are put in this position on the
One lawyer has commented on this process as follows: "What counts as fact? What can sustain
us? With more and more sophisticated technologies we have destroyed the stories. In court cases, we
word search transcripts to reassemble the evidence; it doesn't resemble anything that was said, by
anyone. We cut the words, even our written words, away from the environment, and hold them up as
pieces of meaning, hacked up pieces of meaning. As lawyers we don't have to take any responsibility
to construct a world. We only have to destroy another's construction. We say no. We are civilized, well.
heeled, comfortable carriers of no. We thrive on it. Other races die." L. Hall Pinder, The Carriers of No:
After the Land Claims Trial (Vancouver: Lazara Press, 1991) at 11-12.
119 There are only sixteen Aboriginal judges in Canada, none of whom sit on an appellate court.
For an article which explains the importance of Aboriginal control over traditional knowledge and
culture, see G. Christie, "Aboriginal Rights, Aboriginal Culture and Protection" (1998) 36 Osgoodc
Hall L. J. 447.
120For one historian's description of his "ordeal" in court, see A. J. Ray, "Creating the Image of
the Savage in Defence of the Crown" (1990) 6 Native Stud. Rev. 13.
[VOL. 39, NO. I
Listening for a Change
witness stand, and from within their worldview, subjected themselves to the
highest form of ridicule and humiliation that they could suffer.
While this treatment places a tremendous strain on the individual
enduring this experience, it also represents a major challenge to the culture
more generally. To directly challenge or question elders about what they
know about the world, and how they know it, strains the legal and
constitutional structure of many Aboriginal communities. To treat elders
in this way can be a substantial breach of one of the central protocols within
many Aboriginal nations, somewhat akin to asking judges to comment on
their decision after it is written. To subject elders to intensive questioning
can come across as ignorance and contempt for the knowledge they have
preserved, and a disrespect and disdain for the structures of the culture that
they represent. Yet such behavior is currently mandated by the Canadian
legal system, and reveals the problems Aboriginal elders encounter in
placing their traditions before the courts in the same way, and on the same
footing, with the types of evidence with which courts. Creating alternatives
for assessing the veracity and weight to be assigned to this testimony that
respect the place of elders in Aboriginal communities, would improve
interpretations of Aboriginal oral history in the courts. Greater innovation
through Aboriginal participation could represent one such step.
VI. CONCLUSION
InDeiganuukw, the Supreme Court's accommodation ofAboriginal
oral tradition was meant to counteract previous shortcomings in the
Canadian legal system's treatment of this form of evidence.' The Court
spoke of those occasions in which it would intercede if deficiencies in the
reception of this history were apparent in any trial. It wrote that in "eases
involving Aboriginal rights, appellate intervention is...warranted by the
failure of a trial court to appreciate the evidentiary difficulties inherent in
adjudicating Aboriginal claims when, first, applying the rules of evidence
and, second, interpreting the evidence before it."'" In deciding to review
121 The trial judge's treatment of the various kinds of oral histories did not satisfy the prnciples
I laid dowr in Man der Peet. These errors are particularly %,.orrisome..." D6a'in.wd, (S.C.C.), Rupra
note 61 at 1079.
122Ddgamauukvibid. at 1065, perJustice Lamer. The challengesof receiigAbonginal evv:idco
were described as follows: "Many features of oral historiesvould count aainst both their admi' 7bility
and their weight as evidence of prior events in a court that took a traditional approach to the rules of
evidence. The most fundamental of these is their broad social role not only as a rezisitoryof hrtoncal
knowledge for a culture but also as an expression of the %alues and mores.-,of [that] culture'" td.4J at
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the treatment of Aboriginal oral tradition on new grounds the Supreme
Court may have created a larger task that it realized. As this article has
tried to identity, the interpretation of oral history presents numerous
interpretive difficulties that go beyond those identified in Canadian law.
Much still remains to be done to address the issues of structural bias,
cultural incognizance, cultural control, and the breach of Aboriginal law
that Indigenous peoples encounter in bringing their traditions before the
courts. Aboriginal oral tradition may find itself on less than an equal
footing in Canadian law until these deeper issues are addressed.
Until more far-reaching changes occur, therefore, oral history's
complex character may continue to cause great confusion and lead to its
disrepute for judges who fail to appreciate its simultaneous strengths and
weaknesses. They may find its shifting purposes hard to grasp. It can
sometimes be a very important source of evidence concerning actual events
that occurred in the past. At other times, however, oral history could
mislead judges about the factual happenstance of prior events if they fail to
discern its more "evaluative" elements. At such times, while its factual
contribution may lie in its revelation of the meaning that people attach to
their history, because of this history's interpretive difficulties these insights
may be lost. It is important to be alert for oral history's transubstantiative
qualities. While not perfect, it can sometimes provide persuasive evidence
of past events; it may also mingle this evidence with an insightful
interpretation of those very same events. Canadian law may not yet be
ready to live with the implications of this "fact."
If there is any hope for a more nuanced response to the
presentation and reception of oral history, aside from key structural
changes and/or a deeper knowledge of Aboriginal legal traditions and
culture on the part of the judiciary, it may come from the observation that
Canadians are somewhat familiar with the need to treat written histories
with different lenses depending on their particular contexts.' Most readers
of documentary evidence do not interpret written history in a homogeneous
and undifferentiated manner. For example, people are generally used to
1068. For further discussion, see C. MeLeod, "The Oral Histories of Canada's Northern People, Anglo
Canadian Evidence Law and Canada's Fiduciary Duty to First Nations: Breaking Down the Barriers
of the Past" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 1276 at 1279.
123 The authorwould like to thank an anonymous reviewerfor bringing this point to his attention.
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reading the Illiad,' 24 Bible,' 2  Ramayana, z' Norse Sagas,27 and Mayan
Codexes,12 and other great texts of history, as containing a mixture of
literal and psychological facts. In analyzing these written documents from
an historical perspective, people have long known that not every fact can be
treated in the same manner. These texts have been described as poly-
functional: containing a plurality of factual insights and conveying a
multiplicity of truths from different methodological perspectives.'-" The
acquaintance with the cultural contexts of these books allow readers to
almost unconsciously to sift through these books' various factual elements.
It is easier to analyze their different "truths" with a knowledge of the
customs and values of the societies (or their successors) from which these
books draw their meanings. This familiarity enables readers to evaluate
those instances in which the literal occurrence of a past event is of
importance for understanding the text, and when it is a psychological fact
that the authors are attempting to convey.
If judges examine oral history with their own complex experiences
of written history in mind, they may be better able to appreciate the
variegated nature of fact found in Aboriginal oral traditions. Such
awareness may give them a greater appreciation of how Aboriginal
traditions operate in their particular contexts, sincejudicial fluencywith the
above-mentioned texts may be closer to their own culture than to that of
Aboriginal traditions. While this analogical process will not likely give
judges specific answers to the meaning of historical facts in Aboriginal oral
histories that are before them, this process might help them exercise greater
124 D. Page, History and the Hoinneuie likad (Berkelc): Unitersitv of California Pres. 1972)
125 1. Finkelstein & N.A. Silberman, The Btible Uncarlhcd. Archac!cdo,: s N I inwn of 4Anctnt
Israd and The Origin of Its Sacred Tarts (Toronto: Free Pre_ , 101), see estzcially 14-24, The author's
observations concerning memory and history in the Bible are summarized in their statement concerning
the Exodus: "The saga of Israel's exodus from Egypt is neither historical truth nor literary fiction. It is
a powerful expression of memory and hope born in a torld in the midst of change." ib:d. at 70-71. S.e
also H. Shanks & D.P. Cole, eds., Eay Israd (Washington: Biblical Archaeology S"ety. 1993)
126 J. Keay, India:A History (London: HarperCollins, 2200) at 44-47.
127 See E. Whalgren,"Fact and Fancy in the Vinland Sagas im E. Plumq ed., Old +.eIonztnr
andMytho!ogi, (Austin: Universityof Texas Press, 1969) at 19--0. A recent compilationof the ag~astIth
a good introduction by Jane Miley, is R. Kellogg, The Sagas of the lcrdanders, (Nc., York Pefnguin
Books, 2001).
128 D. Drew, The Lost Chronicles of the 1faa InKws (London; Weidenfcld & Nzcolo n3.1 at
290-335.
1, For a discussion of the "poly-functionality* of the Icelandic sagas, see M-E. Kalinke TxeflqA
of Reykjaholar The Last of the Great Medieval Lqejndaries (Toronto: Umi tcrity of Toronto Prcs, 195)
at 8-9.
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patience and insight when faced with such an inquiry. The tolerance
generated by this second sober thought, combined with their critical self-
reflection about how they understand different facts in the texts they are
familiar with, might help judges analyze the process of how they came to
know the various "truths" to which they subconsciously subscribe. Many
important insights may be revealed in this process of internalized judicial
review, where decision makers reconsider their own reasoning process
about "facts." This practice could in turn lead to better questions about the
nature of fact in legal inquiries related to Aboriginal oral traditions. As a
majority of the Supreme Court observed, "Judicial inquiry into the factual,
social and psychological context within which litigation arises is not unusual.
Rather, a conscious, contextual inquiry has become an accepted step
towards judicial impartiality." 3 '
It should come as no surprise, however, that this form of inquiry is
not easy. Analyzing a factual record in its various contexts and articulating
how one knows that something is a "fact" is not a simple task. 3 , The
cultural and temporal separation from certain facts, caused by different
cultural contexts and the contraints of time in a formal court setting, are
likely to invoke a measure of humility in even the most seasoned judge.
Nevertheless, "U]udicial inquiry into context" is necessary because it
"provides the requisite background for the interpretation and the
application of the law." 32 Common law judges cannot turn away from their
duty to provide public reasons about how and what they determined were
factual conclusions in any given case involving oral history. They do not
have the luxury that other people might have in deferring judgment until
there is a "stable academic consensus" on the question.' Judges must
evaluate how they came to regard a particular point of knowledge as a
"fact," and articulate their findings for others' evaluation and response.
This measured, nuanced, and contextual approach to Aboriginal
oral history is likely required in order to correctly follow the Supreme
Court's instructions to place oral history "on an equal footing with the types
130 S. (.D.), supra note 113 at 507, per Justices L'Heureux-Dub and McLachlin.
131
For recent neurological research that probes the question of how we come to consciousness
and knowledge, see A.R. Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion and the Making of
Consciousness (New York: Harcourt, 1999); A.R. Damasio, Descartes' Error Emotion, Reason, and the
Human Brain (New York: Putnam, 1994). For an exploration of Damasio's finding in a legal context,
see J. Nedelsky "Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 91.
13 2 S. (RD.), supra note 113 at 507, per Justices L'Heurcux-Dub6 and McLachlin.
13 3 R. v. Marshall [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 at 488.
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of historical evidence that courts are familiar with."" Along vith other
relevant factors, it takes "into account the perspective of the Aboriginal
peoples themselves" in adapting the laws of evidence so that their
intellectual "practices, customs and traditions...are given due weight."'
Such an inquiry is consistent with what the Court envisioned as a "special
approach" needed to place "equal weight" on Aboriginal oral tradition
because it subjects all determinations of fact on this question to an
appropriate contextual analysis. As judges become more aware of why
certain types of evidence are familiar to them (and therefore more likely to
be accepted), this process of self-reflection may lead them to a better
weighting, evaluation, and acceptance of factual evidence with which they
are unfamiliar. Indeed, such a process"is apre-conditiontoimpartiality. '
The conscious comparison of different factual perspective at issue in a trial,
including the judges' critical examination of their own perspective,"" is
crucial to the fair disposition of cases involving Aboriginal oral history."?3
It is also, to quote Nedelsky, "the path out of the blindness of our subjective
private conditions. The more views we are able to take into account, the
less likely that we are to be locked into one perspective...It is th[is] capacity
for 'enlargement of mind' that makes autonomous, impartial judgement
possible."' 9
Aunt Irene's old blue bungalow now sits empty atop the
escarpment. She died a few years ago but her memories live on. Her house
holds meaning for me in my reflections about oral history's variegated
nature. The weeds have gathered, paint has cracked, and her windows have
dulled. But much about the place still remains vibrant. I knov more about
past events on the reserve as a result of our conversations. I also Inov, more
about what these past events meant to the people who experienced them.
When I drive down the road in front of her house I remember these stories,
and think of their significance for the people of Cape Croker today.
Neyaashingaming struggles in many ways because of its past. Colonialism
is not an easy thing to live with. Yet, Neyaashingaming is also stronger
134 Delgainuukv ($.C.), supra note 62 at 1069.
135 Ibid. at 1067.
13 6 S. (R.D.), supra note 113 at 507.
137 Ibid. at 506, per Justices UHeureux-DubH and McLachln, 533-534, plr Justice Cory
133 Degamuukiv (S.CC), supra note 61 at W66, Fr Justice Lamer
139 S.(R.D.),supra note 113 at I07. perJusticesLHcurctti-Dub and McLachlhn for the m jority,
citing Professor Jennifer Nedelsky.
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because of these experiences. The same history that produced adversity can
also become a deep reservoir holding ideas for change and renewal. I hope
this potential for change can be harnessed. The appropriate use of oral
history's multifaceted purposes may one day help activate this power.
